We find that a small set of financial columnists has a causal effect on short-term aggregate stock market prices. For some journalists ("bulls") the market reaction is consistently positive, whereas for others ("bears") it is negative. Because bulls and bears are rotated exogenously in our setting, we can make causal inferences about the media's impact on aggregate market returns. Journalist effects are much stronger after extreme returns, suggesting that amplification or attenuation of existing sentiment is the mechanism underlying the financial media's influence.
Introduction
The media is often modeled as a faceless institution, but its main output -news content -is generated by specific people. This is important because unlike, say, making tires or processing paper, writing is a fiercely individualistic craft that allows an author's style, persuasion, views, or bias to be injected into the finished product. In this paper, we present direct evidence that the writing of specific journalists has a casual effect on aggregate market outcomes. This is surprising because, at any point in time, individual columnists are unlikely to possess information advantages relative to the market as a whole, let alone consistently over a period of several years. Thus, any persistent return predictability related to specific authors must arise from their "sentiment" or spin of public information. From 1970 to 2007, we find that the short-term returns on the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) can be predicted knowing only the author of a widely read market summary article, the Wall Street Journal's "Abreast of the Market" (AOTM)
column.
Ordinarily we would be concerned about the endogenous nature of news coverage in an article summarizing market events. As Tetlock (2007 Tetlock ( , p. 1139 notes, "It is unclear whether the financial news media induces, amplifies, or simply reflects investors' interpretations of stock market performance." Making a distinction between a reflective and a causal role for financial media thus requires exogenous variation in news content, or reporting uncorrelated with underlying events.
Our setting is particularly useful in this regard. Over the nearly four decades we study, columnists rotate frequently -three different journalists write the AOTM column in the typical month -and often according to regular schedules. Moreover, journalists differ markedly in their writing styles such as sentence structure, complexity, article length, and even pessimism or optimism about market conditions. Our empirical strategy exploits rotation and these cross-journalist differences to identify a causal effect on investor behavior.
In our main tests, the dependent variable in a linear regression is the daily excess return on the DJIA Index. The control variables include several lags of returns, day of the week dummies, time effects, lagged volume, and lagged volatility. Our primary interest is the twenty-five vectors of journalist indicators, one for each financial columnist writing for the WSJ during our sample period. These fixed effects are statistical stand-ins for both observable and unobservable content differences that persist between financial columnists.
We find that journalist fixed effects are significant predictors of future DJIA returns. Specifying only the name of the financial columnist writing for the WSJ on a given day increases predictive power of the regression by 40-50% relative to the other control variables. In linear restriction tests, journalists are jointly significant at predicting returns on both the day the journalist's article is published, as well as the day immediately following.
Because we are examining signed rather than absolute market returns, we can interpret the columnist coefficients as capturing their average bullishness or bearishness. When a bullish (bearish) columnist writes, the market inches upward (downward) a few basis points. However, this specification masks what is potentially a more important question: can journalists exert a unilateral influence on investor behavior, or must certain conditions be met for them to have an effect?
Answering this speaks directly to the mechanism underlying any media effects we observe. If the role of financial journalists is ultimately to provide color and interpretation to market events, we would expect for their effects to be highest around news events and volatile returns. On the other hand, evidence on limited attention might suggest that investors are least persuadable during these busy periods, and therefore, that financial journalism might matter in "quieter" times. 1 To address this issue, we augment our benchmark specification by interacting each of the columnist fixed effects with lagged stock returns. Positive interaction coefficients identify journalists that contribute to positive serial correlation, effectively amplifying whatever investor sentiment may exist. A negative coefficient suggests the opposite -a contrarian writer who tempers enthusiasm, dampening the market response. We find that richer specifications including these interactions increase the explanatory power of the regression by yet another 50%, and yield significant coefficients for a full eighty percent of the journalists in our sample. Together, a coherent story emerges: journalists influence market returns, but primarily via amplification or attenuation. In other words, journalists matter in financial markets, but not in isolation from underlying events.
The biggest challenge to a causal interpretation is that the selection of journalists may not be orthogonal to future market returns. For example, one might worry about an editor assigning a certain writer after steep declines -unless we can perfectly control for any continuation or reversal effects, 2 future returns might be spuriously correlated with the presence of certain journalists.
Fortunately, the fact that there is considerable predictability in columnist scheduling allows us to deal directly with this possibility.
Rather than explaining stock returns using which journalist's article was published that day, we instrument for the author using his past scheduling information. For example, a common arrangement is for one journalist to write on Monday to Thursday for a few weeks, and for a different one to spell him on Fridays. These and other scheduling patterns make past writing activity a valid predictor for future activity, but importantly, not in a way that can be plausibly related to future returns. Although somewhat weaker than the benchmark regressions, the instrumental variable specifications yield jointly significant coefficients for both the journalist indicators (p = 0.02) and their interactions with returns (p < 0.001). Because we are using only information exogenous to returns to predict journalist arrival, this specification represents perhaps the strongest evidence for a causal relation.
We conclude our analysis with a number of robustness exercises. While our main regressions use DJIA close-to-close prices, the results are similar if we use DJIA open-close prices, or if we analyze other series such as the CRSP value-weighted or S&P 500 Index. Our results do not appear to be driven by outliers, for either returns or journalists. If we use GARCH-adjusted or winsorized returns as our dependent variable, the results hold. Similarly, if we include only the ten most frequently credited authors, the relations we document in the main analysis remain.
While interpreting our results, it is important to note that we do not attempt to relate direct, daily content measures -e.g., word counts, sentence length, article tone -to daily stock returns.
There are two reasons why. First, because article content largely reflects contemporaneous market conditions, one worries about reverse causation, as Tetlock (2007) discusses. This is not likely to be a concern when relating average returns to the day a particular journalist writes. Second, and perhaps more importantly from a methodological perspective, our measure of news content is not limited to those generated by computerized algorithms. Because we rely exclusively on columnist rotation to identify content changes, our method will pick up any persistent variation, whether or not we can measure it otherwise. In other words, our study is agnostic about whether the usual content proxies (e.g., word counts) generate the return effects we observe, or whether more subtle stylistic elements are responsible.
A number of studies have documented the media's ability to shift public opinion, particularly with regard to voting patterns (DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007), and Gerber, Karlan, and Bergan (2009)). What makes the present results so surprising is the strong theoretical assumption that the media should not, apart from information effects, be able to influence prices, certainly at the aggregate level. 3 Whereas there are models to explain why consumers might be susceptible to biased reporting -and by extension, why media outlets may then have an incentive to misreport to them (Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) ) -prices of financial securities should not reflect bias due to informed traders. That they do is consistent with market frictions limiting such arbitrage. However, the impact of journalists on returns is strongest at the very end of our sample (2000 to 2007), when transaction costs were at historic lows and opportunistic hedge funds were most active.
Our study contributes to a growing literature exploring the connection between the media and the stock market. Tetlock (2007) is seminal in this regard, showing that the percentage of negative words in the AOTM predicts next-day market returns. One of our key aims is to shed light on the underlying mechanism -i.e., to distinguish whether the media reflects existing investor sentiment or causes it to change. Because journalist arrival is random, our experimental design allows us to claim a cause-and-effect relationship between the print media and financial market outcomes. While a number of similarly motivated studies present evidence that the media can influence the prices and trading of individual securities (Huberman and Regev (2001) , Reuter and Zitzewitz (2006) , Engelberg and Parsons (2010) ), causal evidence at the market level is absent. This distinction is important, because although journalists could conceivably be informed about a particular stock, this is nearly impossible at the aggregate level.
Finally, our paper adds to a growing literature that focuses on the effects of individuals on economic outcomes. For example, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) demonstrate that specific managers influence firms' investment and capital structure decisions, while Chevalier and Ellison (1999) show that personal fund manager characteristics are related to investment choices and fund performance. 3 An information story would require a few financial columnists to have persistent information advantages over the entire market, a claim that seems implausible in the short term, even more so over many years. Second, recalling that columnists are affiliated with return patterns of a particular sign, these information advantages would need to be both journalist-and sign-specific. For example, columnist John Smith would need to consistently receive private, positive signals about future returns.
Like these studies, we show that individualism matters -not only for the expression of media content, but also for aggregate economic outcomes based on it.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the data and define our key variables. Section 3 presents evidence that specific journalists influence the aggregate market. Within this section, we also characterize whether the effects of financial journalism vary with market conditions. We deal with the potential endogeneity of journalist scheduling in Section 4, presenting the results when we instrument for journalist arrival using past scheduling information. Section 5 concludes.
Data

Market returns and news articles
Two main data sources are used in this paper: the "Abreast of the Market" (AOTM) column from the Wall Street Journal, and the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) price and dividend series.
Our sample period spans January 1, 1970 to December 31, 2007. Data further back is available for both sources, but it was not until approximately 1970 that the AOTM column was consistently published with the accompanying author's name.
Our main dependent variable is the excess daily return on the DJIA Index. 4 From Yahoo! Finance, we extract a daily series of closing prices for the DJIA and then we add the price-weighted dividend yield for each of the index's components because the DJIA is a price-weighted index. 5 Defining r t as the DJIA excess return and p t as the level of the DJIA index at the close of day t, we have
where r f,t+1 is the one-month Treasury bill rate obtained from the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP), and dp t+1 is the price-weighted average dividend yield for the stocks in the DJIA index defined as
4 We use DJIA returns as our dependent variable following Tetlock (2007) , who argues that the AOTM column tends to disproportionately cover the blue-chip stocks of the DJIA. However, our main results are nearly identical when we use other aggregate return series, e.g., the S&P 500 Index or the CRSP Value-Weighted Index (see Tables  8 and 9 ).
5 Changes in the level of the DJIA ignore distributions to shareholders. See Sialm and Shoven (2000) .
One-day lagged prices are used in the calculation of the DJIA aggregate dividend yield. This is to avoid the price adjustments that occur following a dividend issue or stock split. Over our sample period, the total excess return of the DJIA averaged 2.6 basis points, equating to an annualized few exceptions on national holidays. Occasionally, there are two articles published before the next trading day. In this instance only the most recent article is used. Additionally, during this period there are 40 days when the stock market is open, but no AOTM column is available from our data sources. Overall, our sample includes 9,552 articles, over a period of 9,592 open market days. We restrict our attention to journalists which wrote at least fifty AOTM columns. For a small number of articles (76), we are either unable to identify the author, or the author wrote fewer than fifty articles. A similarly small number (516) were co-written, in which case authorship is credited to neither journalist. 9 Overall, this results in a set of twenty-five authors, which account for over 80 percent of the articles in our sample period. Table 1 presents a number of statistics related to each journalist's writing schedule. Moving across the table, we first list the journalist's last name, the years he was active (AOTM was not authored by any female columnists during our sample period), and the total number of articles he wrote. A crucial feature of our identification strategy is that journalists tend to alternate or rotate with one another over the same time period. We show this graphically in Figure 1 , which plots with X's the dates each journalist wrote, separately for each columnist by row. We note that five authors were responsible for the bulk of the writing during 1970-1984, whereas in the late 1980s and early 1990s there was significantly more turnover. However, the more important observation is that at any point in time, there are multiple active authors. For example, at the year 1980 mark, we see frequent activity from four different columnists: Hillery, Elia, Marcial, and Metz. Inspection of other dates reveals a similar pattern. Without this overlap we would not be able to separately identify any impact journalists might have on investor behavior from simple time trends.
Journalist scheduling
Returning to Table 1 , we see also that journalists tend to write articles in relatively brief spells.
Shown in the fourth column is Number of Rotations, which identifies the number of instances where, for each time a journalist wrote, a different columnist wrote the following day. For example, 9 Our results are nearly identical if dual authorship is credited.
Marcial penned 625 articles, but had only only 364 Rotations. This means that for 625 − 364 = 261 days, Marcial directly followed one of his own articles the next business day, e.g., writing on a consecutive Wednesday and Thursday. Because our empirical tests will ultimately compare market returns between days when, for example, Marcial's articles were published to days when they were not, these transitions are important. For journalists that write less frequently (the bottom half on the table), the typical spell falls between 1 and 2 days, whereas for the more frequent authors, spells are two to three times longer on average. Garcia is a notable outlier, writing over 588 columns, but rotating only 70 times, for an average spell length of over 8 days. An important caveat is that although the evidence in Table 1 , and Figure 2 seem to suggest some degree of scheduling predictability, this is not necessary (although it would be sufficient) for our later return regressions to be properly specified. Because we will be examining returns after a given columnist's article is published, the main concern is that certain writer selection somehow depends on future market returns. Clearly, this will not be the case if journalist rotations are completely deterministic, as some periods in our sample appear to be, or completely random.
Even in times when the journalist selection rule is less obvious, note that mis-specification requires that: 1) editors have private knowledge of short-term market returns, 2) editors have an incentive to make selections based on this information, and 3) any such relationship be sign-specific -e.g., O'Brien must be consistently selected prior to abnormally good days, or Rosenberg prior to bad ones. Whether or not one views these possibilities as jointly, or even individually plausible, the predictability indicated in Figure 2 allows us to address such concerns directly. In robustness tests (Table 7) , we will instrument for each journalist's arrival using his recent schedule, e.g., using
whether Rosenberg wrote last Friday to predict whether he writes this Friday. Here, identification comes purely through factors orthogonal to future returns, and allows us to be more confident in our claim of a causal relation between media content and stock returns.
Writing styles
Relative to other studies that explore the impact of written content on investor behavior, an important methodological distinction is how we measure content. Almost without exception, similar papers have characterized written articles using computerized algorithms that count, for example, "negative" or "positive" words using financial dictionaries (e.g., Loughran and McDonald (2009) ).
Such procedures have the advantage of being able to link one or more specific content metrics to investor behavior. However, a shortcoming is that automated programs may neither completely, nor accurately, summarize how a human audience interprets the written word. To the extent that subtlety, phrasing, irony, understatement, or the countless other stylistic tools available to writers impact how an article is perceived, reliance on impersonal algorithms may cause the econometrician to miss important variation in news content.
The key to our identification is that such stylistic differences likely differ across journalists, but may be difficult to directly measure. It is obvious that Charles Dickens and William Faulkner, for example, employ different themes and rhetorical techniques in their writings, and indeed, such differences have occupied the attention of literary critics for decades. But it seems equally obvious that what truly makes Dickens 'Dickens' (or Faulkner 'Faulkner') cannot be easily quantified, regardless of how sophisticated the analysis may be. Like performing a violin concerto or preparing a fine meal, summarizing the nuances of a written article may be impossible, relative to simply specifying its creator.
Ultimately, this argument highlights both the main strength and weakness of our empirical strategy. While focusing on cross-journalist differences in writing style, we will implicitly capture any persistent differences in stylistic or thematic choices, no matter how difficult they may be to directly measure. On the other hand, such a reduced form approach is relatively agnostic about the underlying mechanisms -the tools each author employs to distinguish his writing from that of his peers. We will not focus on whether O'Brien chooses simpler sentences, writes longer article, uses more positive words, etc. -not only because we lack theoretical guidance, 10 but also because we have little hope of summarizing cross-journalistic differences with a small number of observable 10 There is a complete lack of theory relating quantifiable measures of media content to stock returns. Existing empirical studies focus almost exclusively on an article's "tone," but there are a number of other measures -e.g., simplicity of language, article length, etc. -that could either affect returns directly, or through interaction with other metrics.
characteristics.
Nonetheless, the analysis of these observable content metrics, shown in Table 2 In interpreting these differences, it is important to note that these represent marginal effects, after controlling for past returns, volume, and volatility. Consequently, the coefficients in Table 2 capture the incremental impact of a given columnist writing, given whatever prevailing market conditions may be.
Moving across the table, we find that columnist fixed effects are even more important for the number of number of syllables, words per sentence, percentage of complex words, and the Fog in-dex. The increase in explanatory power ranges from a full ten percent (for Syllables) to five percent (for Fog), and in most cases, well over half the journalists are individually significant at conventional levels. Note that differences in writing style do not appear correlated with writing activity; journalists at the top of the list (the most frequent authors) do not appear to be systematically more positive, more brief, or more complex than their sporadic counterparts. Overall, the data suggests there are significant differences in the writing style of the twenty-five journalists under consideration.
3 Journalists and market returns
Univariate patterns
We begin our main analysis with some simple univariate comparisons. In Table 3 , for each columnist we list: 1)r wrote , the average excess return on the days his articles are published, 2)r day after , the average excess return the day after his article is published, and 3)r other , the average excess return on all other days over his writing tenure. For example, Table 1 indicates that Hillery authored 2413 AOTM articles from 1970 to 1984. The average DJIA return on the days these articles were published was slightly less than 1 bp, and on the day afterward, 3 bp. By contrast, the average DJIA return from 1995 to 2002 on the complement set of days when another journalist wrote the AOTM column was −3.4 bp. This comparison thus holds constant the average returns over each journalist's tenure, so that the fact that one journalist wrote mostly in the 1970s (when average returns were low), while another wrote in the late 1990s (when they were not), is not a concern.
We see that of the twenty-five WSJ columnists, over one-third are associated with significant abnormal returns, either the day their articles are published or the day afterward. These are split fairly evenly between positive and negative abnormal returns. In an absolute sense, a few journalists (e.g., Pasha and McGee) are associated with particularly striking abnormal returns, in the range of 40 bp per day. However, the more representative case, based on number of articles written, implies magnitudes roughly half to a quarter as large (e.g., O'Brien 20 bp on day t + 1, Pettit −6 bp on day t).
Regressions
To more formally characterize the univariate patterns seen in Table 3 , we estimate the following linear regression:
where r t is the excess return of the DJIA index on day t, as defined in Equation (1) . All returns are nominal and are reported in basis points.
The variables of interest, the Journalist fixed effects, correspond to each of the twenty-five WSJ columnists, i, active from 1970-2007. If columnist i is the author of the AOTM for publication the morning of day t, then Journalist i,t takes a value of one, and zero otherwise. Going backward in time, β i,t−1 captures the effect of columnist i's article published yesterday on today's returns, or alternatively, the effect of journalist i one day after his article is published.
Only a few variables have been shown to be significant predictors of one-or two-day returns: lagged returns, trading volume, lagged volatility, day of the week, and a dummy for the month of January. Of these, perhaps the most important in our context is the day of the week, given that Figure 2 indicates strong intra-week patterns for AOTM columnists. Our specification controls for the effects of these variables on market returns. In particular, the Controls vector includes five lags of returns, five lags of detrended daily log NYSE volume, five lags of detrended squared DJIA residuals (i.e. lagged volatility), day-of-the-week dummies, and a dummy variable for the month of January. Newey-West standard errors are calculated using five lags.
We begin with the first column of Table 4 , which focuses on the effects of articles published the same day returns are measured (analogous tor wrote in Table 3 ). The introduction of the control variables reduces the statistical significance, but in general, the point estimates are similar to those found in the univariate comparisons. The point estimates have the same sign in 19 of the 25 cases, and for all 6 cases of disagreement, the coefficients are estimated imprecisely. Below the coefficient estimates, we show the p-values for the joint test that β i,t = 0 for all journalists i. Depending on how standard errors are calculated, the joint significance is between 1% and 4%.
Moving to the right, we see the impact on current returns of articles written for publication yesterday -i.e., we are explaining Wednesday's excess returns as a function of which journalist authored AOTM on Tuesday. This corresponds to ther day af ter column in Table 3 . As we see, the evidence is even stronger in this column, suggesting that the impact of specific journalists lasts more than one day. We find that seven journalists are now significant at the 10% level, compared to only four in the previous column. O'Brien, Rosenberg, Ip, Pasha, Dorfman, and McGee are all associated with abnormal excess return at better than the 5% level. The p-values for the joint linear restriction test indicate strong statistical significance (p-value < 0.001).
At the bottom of the first column, we present the R 2 of the excess return regression, with and without the full set of journalist fixed effects. The low explanatory power for both the restricted (β i,t−1 = β i,t = 0) and unrestricted cases is expected, given that we are examining high frequency returns. Still, percentage wise, the improvement is impressive. Journalist fixed effects explain more than an additional 50% of daily excess returns, relative to that explained by time effects, recent returns, volatility, and trading volume.
Comparing the first and second columns of Table 4 , it is interesting that with three exceptions -O'Brien, Pasha, and McGee -the journalists significant on day t are different than those significant on day t − 1. Although not our main objective, a perhaps interesting observation is that journalists with an immediate impact appear to write simpler or more "digestible" articles. Even including journalists with return effects on both days, we note that day t writers are associated with fewer sentences (89.8 vs. 98.0), fewer words per sentence (11.6 vs. 12.1), a lower % of complex sentences vs. 11.9. We stop short of making a causal inference from the differences here, noting only that it is consistent with investors having finite cognitive resources, and therefore needing processing time. 12 
When Does Financial Journalism Matter?
The tests so far have considered the average marginal impact of each journalist, but have ignored whether their effects are dependent upon market conditions. It is not obvious what we should expect, and largely depends on whether we view financial journalists as mostly providing interpre-tation of underlying events, or as primarily creating de novo content. To draw an analogy with other branches of journalism, should we think of financial journalists as being like sportswriters (who requires a game on which to comment), or to an investigative reporter expected to dig up her own facts and write a groundbreaking story? Table 5 addresses whether the effects of financial journalism are strongest after days of extreme returns, both positive or negative. We start with the specification in Table 4 , but interact each journalist indicator (both on day t − 1 and day t) with the excess return on day t − 1. The goal is to gauge the extent to which return conditions on say, Monday, influence how a journalist's whose article is published on Tuesday are perceived by the market, either on Tuesday or Wednesday.
There are two reasons why we might expect Monday's return conditions (in our example) to influence how investors respond to financial journalism on Tuesday or Wednesday. First, returns proxy for how much information is released to the market. To the extent that financial columnists use this information as a basis for their articles, we might expect stronger marginal effects. Second, extreme returns -particularly large negative returns -may proxy for swings in investor sentiment.
Borrowing the methodology from Tetlock (2007) , García (2010) shows that news-response coefficients in return regressions are stronger in recessions, and interprets this result as investors being more susceptible to slant in reported news during bad times.
Looking first at columns 1 and 2, we see that even in the presence of the interaction terms, the coefficients and statistical significance are similar compared to Table 4 . Of more interest are the final two columns, which show how these slopes are affected by the return environment. In the third column, we find that nearly half of the journalists have a significant interaction coefficient, and nearly as many are significant in the final column.
The diagnostic statistics at the bottom of the table formalize the importance of the return interactions in the return regressions. Recall that in Table 4 , the inclusion of day t and t − 1 journalists increased the R 2 from 2.8% to 3.8%. Here, we see a marked improvement with the journalist-return interactions, to over 6%. Note that all specifications (even the baseline without journalists) include lagged returns -instead, it is the interaction with the journalist fixed effects that makes the dramatic difference. At the bottom of the table, we present p-values for the journalist indicators, the return-journalist indicators, and their union. Regardless of how standard errors are calculated, the joint hypothesis that our coefficients are zero is rejected at better than the 0.1% level.
Given that the journalist-return interactions are important predictors -indeed, even more important than just the journalist indicators alone -it is worth being explicit about their interpretation. While the columnist fixed effects themselves can be interpreted as capturing each columnist's bullishness or bearishness, the interaction terms measure whether a given columnist contributes to, or detracts from, short-term return continuation. In other words, the interactions tell us whether a given journalist amplifies the effects of past returns, or whether he plays an attenuating role.
Take the most frequently credited author, Hillery, as an example. The first two coefficients, β t−1 and β t , indicate that on average, his writings have neither a positive nor negative impact on future returns. However, γ t = −0.145 indicates that the days after an excess return of +100 basis points (roughly the standard deviation of the DJIA), the market would be expected to decline by almost 15 basis points on days when Hillery's articles are published. The +0.214 coefficient on the t − 1 coefficient suggests that this entire effect is (more than reversed) the following day.
Indeed, such reversals are the rule rather the exception. Comparing the interaction coefficients in the last two columns of Table 5 , we see that the signs flip in the vast majority of cases. This suggests that although the effects of financial journalism are magnified around extreme returns, the effects are temporary, and unlikely to have permanent impacts on asset prices. This result is not only consistent with the evidence in Tetlock (2007) , who finds that the effects of word-based predictability reverse within a week, but also with the intuition that financial journalists are unlikely to possess information advantages about the aggregate stock market.
Taken together, the results in this section paint a clearer picture of the power of individual rhetoric in financial journalism. If we think of journalists as actors with the goal of persuading an audience, the results in Tables 3-4 suggest that an actor's identity alone tells us something about the performance he will give. Furthermore, Table 5 indicates that an actor's performance also depends upon the stage he is given. When the stage is set for good news, some journalists make the good news sound even better, while others temper such enthusiasm. By contrast, when the stage is set for bad news, some journalists are somber while others look on the bright side.
Interestingly, it is precisely in times with large price movements when the power of rhetoric has the greatest effect on investors.
Alternative Specifications and Robustness
Endogeneity of Journalist Arrival
The evidence in Tables 3-6 indicates persistent correlation between certain journalists writing and subsequent market returns. In this section, we address the possibility that these tests do not identify a causal relation. The specific concern is that the selection of columnists may not be exogenous with respect to future market returns -e.g., an editor choosing a certain journalist around releases of bad news. If not, then the patterns we observe may be spurious, and thus, tell us nothing about the financial media's ability to influence investor behavior. This is clearly not a problem if the process by which journalists are selected is completely exogenous -preset schedules being a special case. However, although there appears to be considerable predictability in how journalists are chosen (see Figure 2) , it is equally clear that the selection is not completely deterministic, leaving our specifications open to omitted variable bias.
The traditional solution for this problem is to look for an instrumental variable that is correlated with the potentially endogenous variable (here the vector of journalist dummies), but is otherwise unrelated to the dependent variable (future excess market returns). Intuitively, we want to project each journalist's actual schedule onto explanatory variables that we know cannot be systematically correlated with future returns, and use these projections in place of the potentially endogenous variables. Any observed relation thus results from the part of the endogenous variable that is explained solely by exogenous factors, and thus cannot be susceptible to the endogeneity critique.
We are fortunate to be afforded a nearly perfect instrument: each journalist's recent writing schedule. Because journalists tend to write in relatively short bursts, and often on the same day of the week, we can use past writing activity as an instrument for current writing activity. The key to this being exogenous is the time lag. For a given Tuesday in 1972, for example, we use as instruments which journalist wrote on Monday (yesterday), as well as which journalist wrote the Tuesday one week ago and day-of-the-week dummies for that year. Together, these instruments are powerful predictors of actual writing activity, but have no systematic relation to stock returns. Table 6 shows the performance of our instrumental variable specification. We run a daily linear probability model for each journalist, over his respective tenure -i.e., for only the years [1970] [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] for Hillery, 1995-2002 for O'Brien, etc. In the second column, we report the R 2 using only year fixed effects; as seen, this generally produces a poor fit. The third column adds market variables which include five lags of recent returns, five lags of de-trended lagged volume, and five lags of squared DJIA residuals. In most cases, these controls lead to a small increase in explanatory power. In the fourth column, in addition to these variables, we include as regressors year fixed effects interacted with day of the week dummies, and two dummies for journalist i -one dummy indicating if journalist i wrote on the previous day and one indicating if journalist i wrote on the same day the previous week. In all cases, these additional controls substantially increase explanatory power, mostly due to the day of the week interactions, which Figure 2 indicates are strong predictors for most journalists.
Column five presents a formal test of whether the market variables help predict journalist arrivals. For six of the twenty-five journalist there is some predictability, which argues for the IV analysis that we shall construct below. The final column shows the additional explanatory power afforded by our instrumental variables, the one-day and one-week lagged Journalist indicators, interacted with the relevant year. In all but one case -Gonzalez -specifying whether a columnist wrote yesterday, or that particular day the previous week dramatically improves fit. Increases in It is important to note the difference in terms of fit that the market variables provide, relative to the rotation variables. Even though market variables help predict the arrival of Browning (p-value 6%), the increase in the R 2 of the specification from adding such variables is 5.6%. In contrast, adding the rotation variables increases the R 2 to 45.8% -clearly knowing who wrote last Thursday is more important for determining who writes this Thursday than what happened in the markets over the last week.
In Table 7 we use the fitted values of the LPMs from Table 6 , instead of the journalist's actual writing activity, in order to predict DJIA returns. For example, for a given day in 1972, if the journalist rotation model (Table 6) predicts that Hillery will write with 60% probability, we use this fitted value rather than a zero or one, as we did when referring to Hillery's actual writing activity in Table 5 . During the period when a journalist is not actively writing, these fitted values are automatically set to zero.
Comparing the second column of Table 7 with the second column in Table 5 , the similarity is readily apparent. All six columnists with return coefficients significant at the 10% level in Table 5 have point estimates of the same sign in Table 7 , and five (except O'Brien) retain similar statistical significance. The evidence is a bit weaker in the first column. Although we observe similar magnitudes in the IV regression for the three significant journalists in the baseline specification The third and fourth columns of Table 7 show the coefficients on the return interactions under the IV specification. Like the previous columns, the instrumental variable specification generally produces similar point estimates, but somewhat weaker statistical significance. In the third column, the author interactions associated with the most significant effects -Hillery (t = 4.2) Garcia (t = 10.0), Rosenberg (t = 3.9), and McGee (t = −3.5) -all remain significant in the IV regression, with most of the remaining interactions similar across specifications. In the fourth column, 18 of the 25 journalist interactions have the same estimated sign, with nearly unanimous agreement for the most precisely estimated ones. The joint linear restriction test that all interactions are simultaneously zero (γ t−1 = γ t = 0) is soundly rejected (p < 0.001 for all standard error assumptions), as is the joint test of all columnist indicators and their interactions. This latter result is unsurprising, given that the improvement in R 2 due to the columnist variables is comparable to that seen in Table 5 , increasing from 0.028 to 0.062. 13 13 The results are similar if, instead of using the raw probabilities (the outputs of Table 6 ) as inputs into the IV regression: 1) we take the maximum probability observed across journalists, and assign a value of one to that journalist, or 2) we scale all probabilities so that they sum to one across journalists for every date.
Different Return Series and Other Robustness
The first five columns of Table 8 presents the results of the Table 4 In the first column, we consider open-to-close DJIA returns. The second and third column present the results when instead we use excess returns on the S&P 500 Index or CRSP valueweighted index as our dependent variable. As seen, the results are similar for each of these alternatives, compared to the DJIA results shown in Table 4 . The fourth and fifth columns consider GARCH-adjusted and winsorized returns, respectively, which we conduct to address the concern that a few outliers may be responsible for the return patterns we document. In the regression results reported in the Winsorized column returns, volume, and all non-dummy variables are winsorized at the 5 percent level. GARCH-adjusted returns are defined as DJIA close-to-close returns divided by the estimated daily volatility from a GARCH(1,1) model estimated on the same return series.
Both procedures strengthen the statistical significance for the day t columnist fixed effects, and lead to similar significance for the day t − 1 indicators.
The first five columns in Table 9 repeat the interaction regressions of Table 5 , but with the alternative return series. As with the previous table, none of our previous conclusions change. In particular, the joint significance of both the fixed effects (β t−1 and β t ), and their interactions with returns (γ t−1 and γ t ) holds across all specifications. Tables 8 and 9 repeat the specifications in Tables 4 and 5 , expect that we ignore all but the ten most frequently credited authors. As indicated in the summary stats (Table   1) , this restriction implies that we are considering only authors with at least 157 written articles. Table 8 indicates that the p-value for joint significance at day t − 1 is roughly 1%, and about 10% for day t authors. Considered together in Panel C, journalists remain jointly significant at the .4% level. In Table 9 , we consider only these authors in the same specification shown in Table 5 . Like the previous columns, journalist-return interactions are highly significant predictors of short term market returns.
The final column in
We end the analysis with a falsification test, and further study whether the effect of journalists' writing can extend over the two-day window that we have focused on this far. In particular, we augment (3) with one more lag and two more leads. The variable β i,t−2 captures any residual effect from an article published two days prior. Going the other direction, β i,t+1 and β i,t+2 are estimated for falsification. They measure the effect of articles written for publication on future dates (e.g., an article for publication on Thursday influencing Wednesday's returns), and consequently, should have no effect. Table 10 presents the point estimates of such a specification. The rightmost column indicates that generally, any observed journalist-return effects will show up within two business days. Only two journalists -Hillery and Ip -have significant coefficients, and the high p-values at the table's bottom indicate that together, they add little explanatory power to the regression.
The first two columns test for return effects that, under a causal interpretation, should not produce significant results. Each vector β t+1 and β t+2 measures columnist who write on future days, after controlling for current and past authors. For example, if we are measuring Wednesday's excess returns, columns 5, 4, and 3, respectively, tell us which AOTM author was published on Monday (t − 2), Tuesday (t − 1) and Wednesday (t), while columns 1 and 2 pick up who will be published on Thursday and Friday respectively. As expected, future authors have no apparent relation to current returns, with Newey-West p-values of 0.52 and p = 0.66 for t + 1 and t + 2, respectively.
Conclusion
There is widespread speculation that the news media has the power to influence financial markets, apart from simply reporting events. Yet, such claims are often based on anecdotal associations that make causal inferences difficult. For example, times of negative financial reporting frequently coincide with bad economic news, and vice versa. Stripping away the effects of only the reporting thus requires variation in news content that is unrelated to underlying fundamentals.
The identification strategy of this paper is based on two assumptions. The first is that authors of the Wall Street Journal's "Abreast of the Market" column exhibit persistent stylistic differences, such that even for the same set of facts, article content will vary. The second is that the selection of journalists is not systematically related to future returns, an assumption relatively easy to justify given that we are examining returns on a nearly unpredictable market index.
Our results suggest that financial journalists have the potential to influence investor behavior, at least over short time horizons. Adding journalist fixed effects to a daily return regression significantly increases explanatory power, and when these fixed effects are interacted with recent returns, the implied return predictability is even more dramatic. Overall, our results suggest that the interpretation of public news is important, as the effects we uncover are strongest when journalists write about significant market moves.
An important caveat is that although our empirical design permits a causal interpretation, our analysis does not shed light on the specific rhetorical tools that authors use to influence investor behavior. That is, we do not attempt to say whether longer articles, more complex words, or less pessimism leads to a predictable market response. This is not because we cannot quantify a number of content measures, but instead because we think that attempting to gauge a human audience's response may be difficult using computerized algorithms, relative to using statistical stand-ins for human authors. Clearly, we sacrifice the ability to pinpoint specific stylistic techniques, but we hopefully gain by capturing other unobservable elements that vary across journalists. This table presents statistics for each journalist who wrote more than fifty articles for the AOTM column. In particular, it lists the last names of the journalists, the years they were actively writing for the AOTM column (Years Active), the total number of articles they published (Articles), the total number of consecutive writing days for each journalist (Number of rotations), the average length of these rotations (Average rotations), and the percentage of articles each journalist published on each weekday. Panel B reports coefficient estimates from the following regression:
where Characteristicj ∈ {Syllables, WPS, % Complex, Fog} and the Controls vector includes five lags of daily excess DJIA return, five lags of detrended daily log NYSE volume, five lags of detrended squared DIJA residuals, day-ofthe-week dummies, year fixed-effects, a dummy variable for the month of January, and year fixed-effects. The table also presents the number of observations, the R-squared for an unreported regression with no journalist fixed effects, R 2 noJFE , and the R-squared for the model that includes the journalist fixed effects, R 2 JFE . We also present the p-values from an F -test of the following null hypothesis: βi = 0, ∀i. For each test, p-values are reported for F -tests calculated using the OLS variance/covariance matrix, a heteroscedasticity robust variance/covariance matrix (WHITE), and a Newey-West variance/covariance matrix using five lags (NW5). 
The Controls vector is as defined in Table 2 . Coefficient estimates are recorded on the left-hand side of each column and their corresponding OLS t-statistics are presented in parentheses on the right-hand side. This table also presents the number of observations in each regression, the R-squared for an unreported regression with no journalist fixed effects, R 2 noJFE , and the R-squared for the reported regression that includes the journalist fixed effects, R 2 JFE . Also recorded are p-values from F -tests testing the following null hypotheses: βi,t−1 = 0, ∀i; βi,t = 0, ∀i; and βi,t−1 = βi,t = 0, ∀i. For each test, p-values are reported for F -tests calculated using the OLS variance/covariance matrix, a heteroscedasticity robust variance/covariance matrix (WHITE), and a Newey-West variance/covariance matrix using five lags (NW5). 
The Controls vector is as in Table 2 . Coefficient estimates are recorded on the left-hand side of each column and their corresponding OLS t-statistics are presented in parentheses on the right-hand side. The table also presents the number of observations in each regression, the R-squared for an unreported regression with no journalist fixed effects, R 2 no JD, and the R-squared for the reported regression that includes the journalist fixed effects, R 2 JD. Also recorded are p-values from F -tests testing the following null hypotheses: βi,t−1 = βi,t = 0, ∀i; γi,t−1 = γi,t = 0, ∀i; and βi,t−1 = βi,t = γi,t−1 = γi,t = 0, ∀i. For each test, p-values are reported for F -tests calculated using the OLS variance/covariance matrix, a heteroscedasticity robust variance/covariance matrix (WHITE), and a Newey-West variance/covariance matrix using five lags (NW5). The t-statistics that are statistically significant at the 1% level are indicated by * * * , at the 5% level by * * , and at the 10% level by * . Table 6 : Linear probability models -forecasting journalists arrivals
This table presents R 2 for the following linear probability models:
Yi is a vector of year fixed effects for year i, while Dt is a matrix of day of the week dummies. Market Variables represents five lags of DJIA returns, five lags of volume, and five lags of DJIA squared residuals as previously defined. The variable Journalistj,t−7 represents an indicator variable that equals 1 if journalist j wrote on the same day the previous week, and 0 otherwise. Each regression is run using only data for the period during which the corresponding journalist was actively writing. Column 5 presents the p-value for an F -test of H0 : η = 0, and Column 6 reports the OLS p-value for the F -test of H0 : ψi = ρi = ζi = 0, ∀i. 
{ βi,t−1 · IVJournalisti,t−1 + βi,t · IVJournalisti,t + γi,t−1 · rt−1IVJournalisti,t−1 +γi,t · rt−1IVJournalisti,t } + η · Controlst + t.
where IVJournalist is defined as the fitted fitted values from the LPM model of Table 6 , column 4. The Controls vector is as in Table 2 . Coefficient estimates are recorded on the left-hand side of each column and their corresponding OLS t-statistics are presented in parentheses on the right-hand side. The table also presents the number of observations in each regression, the R-squared for an unreported regression with no journalist fixed effects, R 2 no JD, and the R-squared for the reported regression that includes the journalist fixed effects, R 2 JD. Also recorded are p-values from F -tests testing the following null hypotheses: βi,t−1 = βi,t = 0, ∀i; γi,t−1 = γi,t = 0, ∀i; and βi,t−1 = βi,t = γi,t−1 = γi,t = 0, ∀i. For each test, p-values are reported for F -tests calculated using the OLS variance/covariance matrix, a heteroscedasticity robust variance/covariance matrix (WHITE), and a Newey-West variance/covariance matrix using five lags (NW5). The t-statistics that are statistically significant at the 1% level are indicated by * * * , at the 5% level by * * , and at the 10% level by * . { βi,t−2 · Journalisti,t−2 + βi,t−1 · Journalisti,t−1 + βi,t · Journalisti,t + βi,t+1 · Journalisti,t+1 + βi,t+2 · Journalisti,t+2 } + η · Controlst + t
The Controls vector is as in Table 2 . Coefficient estimates are recorded on the left-hand side of each column and their corresponding t-statistics are presented in parentheses on the right-hand side. Also recorded are p-values from F -tests of the following null hypotheses: β i,t+k = 0, ∀i and k ∈ {−2, −1, 0, 1, 2}. For each test, p-values are reported for F -tests calculated using the OLS variance/covariance matrix, a heteroscedasticity robust variance/covariance matrix (WHITE), and a Newey-West variance/covariance matrix using five lags (NW5). t-statistics that are statistically significant at the 1% level are indicated by * * * , at the 5% level by * * , and at the 10% level by * . 
